We presented evidence and arguments that the distinction between states and traits is arbitrary (Allen & Potkay, 1981) , but the arbitrariness has not been sufficiently recognized by psychologists. Zuckerman (1983) has addressed our conclusions in a spirited and thoughtful rejoinder.
He agreed with us that a discrete distinction between state and trait cannot be made. At the same time, he reviewed a method for making ad hoc distinctions among some measures for some constructs. The method is embodied in the statement that if state measures correlate highly with each other on a given occasion and trait measures correlate highly on the same occasion, but neither correlates with the other, an empirical approximation to a distinction might be made. This suggestion involves serious problems because of the greater commonality of item-construction procedures and instructions among state measures than exists between procedures and instructions of state and trait measures. Greater structural commonality among measures of the same type than between meaRequests for reprints should be sent to Bern P. Allen or Charles R. Potkay, Psychology llo, Western Illinois University, Macomb, Illinois 61455.
sures of different types guarantees that correlations among measures of the same type will exceed between-type correlations, regardless of whether the tests differ in basic nature. The following quote highlights the problem: "The sheer lack of similarity in form between trait and state measures reduced the possibility of predicting from one measure to the other" (Zuckerman, 1977, p. 513) .
Four psychometric criteria for differentiating trait and state measures also were identified (Zuckerman, 1983 (Zuckerman, , also see 1976 . However, evidence cited in relation to the application of these criteria was most strongly supportive of the distinction between Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL) "today" and "general" constructs of "anxiety" (his Criteria 1,2, and 4) and of one study that measured the construct "fear" (his Criterion 3). Parallel evidence for MAACL constructs of "depression" and "hostility" was far less supportive; the status of the "general" MAACL as a general trait measure seemed not to be yet established. The generalizability of the data reviewed to assessment techniques and scale constructs other than MAACL Anxiety requires provision of additional evidence.
Erroneous statements in the rejoinder in-dicate that data supporting our contention concerning variability of self-descriptive words are irrelevant to measurement by scales and are contained in unpublished papers. Actually, the two most important papers for support of our position had been published and were cited (Allen & Potkay, 1973 , 1977 . The other papers, along with additional supporting evidence, are summarized in Allen and Potkay (in press ). Those papers show that research employing the Adjective Generation Technique (AGT) has been characterized by heavy reliance on scaled favorability values, not on variation of single words. Each word generated by a subject was assigned a favorability value, and the score for a given occasion was the mean of those scaled values. Variability in scores quantitatively reflected variability of self-descriptive words across occasions. Zuckerman suggests that an approximation to a distinction between states and traits might be empirically established by summing across state test responses collected on some x number of occasions to derive sufficient stability to satisfy trait .assumptions. To the contrary, such use of Epstein's (1979) method of aggregation yields spuriously high stability, because it averages out true variability. To support this contention, a group of psychologists and mathematicians (Day, Marshall, Hamilton, & Christy, Note 1) performed seven, computer studies and one laboratory experiment to show the superiority of their method for assessing stability over that of Epstein. They concluded, "With relatively few repeated observations, [Epstein's index of stability] becomes high when even very small amounts of stability are introduced into the data. . . therefore, [his index] seems to consistently yield spuriously high estimates of behavioral consistency" (p. 7; also see Day, Marshall, Hamilton, & Christy, in press ). Similar conclusions had been reached earlier based on some demonstrations (Allen, Note 2). Artifact due to aggregation must be considered when evaluating Zuckerman's attempts to relate a mean of state measures to single state or trait measures.
The rejoinder includes examples in which a measure of trait anxiety failed to change from a prior level after stress or relaxation had been introduced, whereas a measure of state anxiety did change. However, opposite findings also exist (e.g., see Kendall, Finch, Auerbach, Hooke, & Mikulka, 1976) and were identified in our paper (Allen & Potkay, 1981) . Therefore, any firm conclusion based on before-after measurement seems tenuous.
Zuckerman argues that if two tests have high internal consistency and one shows strong reliability across administrations while the other shows weak reliability, traitlike stability must be inherent in the former, and statelike instability inherent in the latter. Alternately, different reliabilities across administrations for tests with equally high internal consistencies may be due to differences between tests in the demand characteristics built into instructions and items as well as differences between the tests in time interval between administrations. Looking across the several reports of his own work that Zuckerman cites in his rejoinder, we find that generally short intervals were used for the purpose of determining reliabilities. Thus, demand characteristics of instructions, items, and interval all converged to lower the reliability of "state" measures, whereas only the interval acted to lower reliability of "trait" measures. Also, it has been empirically demonstrated that high or low internal consistency can be associated with high or low reliability across administrations, regardless of the assumed nature of the measure ,(e.g., Lachar & Wirt, 1981) .
In various writings, Zuckerman has used the terms state, general state level (1976), specific trait, and general trait (1977) . This proliferation of concepts reflects the arbitrariness of the state-trait distinction. If it is difficult to indicate exactly what is a state and what is a trait, the introduction of additional state and trait concepts seems inevitable. However, Zuckerman's additions to the trait category are puzzling in view of his statement, "It may be that specific trait will prove no better than general trait measures [traditional measures] in predicting state responses [specific behaviors]" (1976, p. 169) , and the finding that general trait proved to be a superior predictor (Zuckerman, 1977) .
Further, one could wonder why Zuckerman would be so concerned about trait measures. He has repeatedly suggested that a mean of state measures provides a better pre-dictor of behavior than traditional trait measures and has redefined trait according to these observations (e.g., Patrick & Zuckerman, 1977) . Despite this claim, data have continually been cast in trait terms. Our paper (Allen & Potkay, 1981) indicated that psychologists-many of whom may be more inclined to one end of the state-trait continuum than the other-continue to consider both state and trait because they have taken the state-trait distinction so much for granted that they are compelled to pay homage to both parts of it. That Zuckerman represents no exception is ironic, because he finds traditional trait measures lacking in predictive power relative to state measures. Abandoning the distinction would leave him with what he feels predicts best.
Generally, we would suggest that psychologists adopt a more neutral, operational approach to predicting behavior. If the interest is in predicting behaviors over the short-term (hours, days), a method of measurement might be chosen that may or may not be different from that used for prediction over the moderate term (weeks, months) or over the long term (years, decades). If researchers are free of the obligation to distinguish between states and traits, they will be free to use whatever works best to predict behavior. It will no longer matter that whatever happens to work best for prediction over the short term was originally called a trait measure and whatever happens to work best for prediction over the moderate term was originally dubbed a state measure. State and trait labels for methods of measurement would no longer act as prohibitions against the use of the methods wherever these might provide successful prediction. 
